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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to determine the impact of an auction based retention bonus and 
other factors on the continuation rates for general dentists completing their initial 
obligation.  An auction based retention bonus has the potential to improve retention rates.  
In lieu of actual bids from Navy general dentists, the difference between average civilian 
dentist salaries and Navy general dentist pay is used to represent theoretical opportunity 
costs.  Inputting opportunity costs into a break-even formula allows approximation of the 
retention bonus amount needed for a one-year and/or a five-year employment agreement 
with the Navy.   
A logistic regression retention model is also estimated using data for 516 Navy 
general dentists commissioned between 1998 and 2001.  Model results indicate that 
accession source significantly affects the decision to continue military service.  Officers 
commissioned as direct accessions and participants in the Dental Student Program are 
more likely to stay in the Navy than participants in the Health Sciences Collegiate 
Program.  Dentists commissioned in 2000-2001 are less likely to stay than those 
commissioned in 1998-1999.  Those commissioned between the ages of 30 and 39 are 
more likely to continue service beyond their initial obligation than younger dentists.  
Race and gender do not significantly affect retention.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) is Navy Medicine 
Headquarters.1  Led by a three-star Admiral, Navy Medicine provides high quality, 
economical health care to beneficiaries in times of war and peace.  All Medical 
Department Officers fall into one of four professional organizations:  Medical Corps, 
Medical Service Corps, Nurse Corps, or Dental Corps.     
Two of the greatest challenges facing these organizations are finding qualified 
candidates to become Medical Department Officers and keeping these highly trained 
personnel beyond their initial obligation.  This is especially true for the Dental Corps 
(DC) where recruitment and retention have become critical issues.  For example, since 
fiscal year 2003, the Dental Corps has not been able to meet its total annual accession 
goals.2  In addition, a Commander Navy Personnel Quick Poll in 2005 found that Dental 
Officers reported they were less likely to continue in the Navy than in previous years.3  
Should these challenges go unmet; the DC will be hard pressed to continue meeting its 
operational and domestic missions.  
1. Research Questions 
• Identify the significant characteristics of general dentists who opt to stay 
and those of general dentists who choose to leave the Navy after 
completing their initial obligation. 
• Identify the opportunity costs of general dentists to aid in determining a 
bonus level that sufficiently entices dentists to remain in military service. 
• Identify potential behaviors (stay / leave) of general dentists given a 
retention bonus. 
                                                 
1 Bureau of Medicine and Surgery webpage 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?selTab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-
ABBA0925B2764081 (Last Accessed January 2007). 
2 CDR Richard Houser, MSC, USN, email to author 14 December 2006. 
3 Carol Newell, Kimberly Whittam, & Zannette Uriell, “CNP Quick Poll, Medical Communities: 
Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Nurse Corps,” 6 June 2005. 
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2. Scope and Methodology 
The goal of this paper is to determine the retention behaviors of general dentists 
facing their first decision to stay or leave the Navy, if retention bonuses were available.  
A regression model is estimated for general dentists to identify the characteristics and 
behaviors of dentists that lead them to continue beyond their initial obligation.  This 
information is then used to indicate who might be interested in receiving a retention 
bonus.  Next, the application of auction theory is used to suggest the response of general 
dentists who are eligible for a retention bonus, given their opportunity costs. Salary 
surveys that compare military and civilian wages are utilized to represent opportunity 
costs since pay is frequently cited as a reason for leaving. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. History of the Navy Dental Corps  
Congress officially established the Navy Dental Corps in 1912 with the 
appointment of “not more than 30 dental surgeons.”4  The contributions of these 
professionals were seen almost immediately as Navy dentists treated conditions that had 
previously kept many recruits from active duty eligibility.5  During World War I, the 
Dental Corps expanded to over 500 dentists assigned to shore commands as well as 
deployable units, such as ships and the United States Marine Corps.6  Today, Navy 
dentists continue the tradition of providing quality dentistry to the men and women in the 
United States Marine Corps and Navy. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Navy Department, Manual of the Medical Department, NAVMED P-117 (Washington, DC: 1996), 
Chapter 6, 3. 
5 “90 Years of Marching Forward.” Dental Corps History at Naval Medicine Online Webpage 
http://navalmedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=about&selmod=7AF79F11-2A5E-780B-
45D6C0D83FF101C8&docid=10307&parentid=942CA57C-802E-D019-A46C463C916A02D3& (Last 
Accessed January 2007). 
6 Ibid. 
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2. Organization and Composition of the Navy Dental Corps 
Headquartered in Washington, D.C. at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the 
Navy Dental Corps is led by a Rear Admiral.  He or she reports to the Chief of the 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and is responsible for matters pertaining to the Dental 
Corps community, including accessions, promotions, training, formulation of policy, and 
oversight of the Department of the Navy Dental Healthcare System.7  
The mission of the Dental Corps is to “ensure dental readiness while optimizing 
dental Health.”8  The DC’s vision is to provide “dental health for those entrusted to our 
care.”9  To accomplish these goals, the corps follows these guiding principles: 
• Proudly serve and are prepared to defend the country. 
• Privileged to be entrusted with the dental health of Sailors and marines.  
Anything less than the best effort violates that trust. 
• Foster pride, teamwork and professionalism by personally exemplifying 
the Navy Core Values:  Honor, Courage, and Commitment. 
• Committed to excellence in clinical dentistry through training, continuing 
education and research. 
• Value the individual contribution of every Sailor, marine, and civilian.  
Nurturing their personal growth and dignity is imperative to mission 
accomplishment. 
• Believe the future is dependent upon developing the best possible leaders 
at every level. 
• Embrace Readiness-Optimization-Integration as the business focus. 
• Believe patients and customers ultimately judge success.10 
 
 
                                                 
7 Navy Department, Manual of the Medical Department, NAVMED P-117 (Washington, DC:1996), 
Chapter 6, 5. 
8 Navy Medicine webpage 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-




There are 1,116 dentists in the DC, representing 18 different specialties working 
towards the DC’s mission and goal.11  The majority of these specialists were originally 
recruited as general dentists, and then, after completing their initial obligation, afforded 
additional training in a dental specialty in exchange for continued service in the Navy.  
Therefore, when accession goals for general dentists are not met, the impact is felt in the 
manning of future specialty levels. In other words, if the Navy is unable to satisfy its 
immediate annual needs for generalists, this potentially affects the number of specialists 
to be trained in the future.  Underlying this fact is that without meeting accession goals 
and siphoning generalists into specialty training programs ultimately means general 
dentists will continue to be undermanned.  Table 1 illustrates these different specialties 
and their current manning status as of June 2006. 
Table 1.   DC Manning by Specialty as of June 30, 200612 
 




Proj EOY % 
Manned 
Military(General)Dentist  410 463 89 7713 
Endodontist 47 47 100 88 
Military Dentist II 121 90 134 120 
Comprehensive Dentist 105 113 93 85 
Maxillofacial Prosth 11 6 183 157 
Orthodontist 20 16 125 112 
Operative Dentist 18 22 75 67 
Oral Diagnostician 10 14 82 57 
Exodontist 42 19 221 200 
Oral Surgeon 78 80 98 77 
Periodontist 53 48 110 102 
                                                 
11 This number reflects actual beginning strength in FY’06 as reported in “Dental Corps One Page 
World Book” by the Dental Corps Analyst, LCDR Roshard Woolfolk, MSC, USN, 15 July 2006. 
12 LCDR Roshard Woolfolk, MSC, USN, “Dental Corps July 2006 World Book.” Data valid as of 30 
June 2006. 
13 CAPT Donald Worm, DC, USN, General Dentist Specialty Leader reported the manning situation at 
63% during a telephone conversation with author 22 December 2006. 
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Proj EOY % 
Manned 
Prosthodontist 49 65 75 72 
Public Health Dentistry 9 7 113 113 
Oral Pathology 9 9 100 100 
Oral Facial Pain 14 10 127 118 
Dental Research 2 6 29 43 
Pediatric Dentist 17 14 106 81 
Students 101 134 75 81 
3. Accession Programs 
As cited earlier, recruiting dentists and dental students has been a challenge for 
the Navy.  These difficulties may be due to a military-civilian wage gap, an active-duty 
commitment during an unpopular war, the prospect of separation from family because of 
operational deployments and more.  Yet, each year approximately 100 individuals join 
the Navy Dental Corps.  Those wanting to become Navy dentists may take advantage of 
one of the multiple commissioning programs available.   
Current accession programs include:14 
• Direct Procurement. Recruiting an officer directly from a civilian 
environment.  
• Recall to Active Duty. The voluntary return of a commissioned officer 
from the Reserve to active component.  
• Interservice Transfer (IST). The transfer of a commissioned officer 
serving on active duty, between uniformed services; or the transfer of 
commissioned officers not on active duty, between the Reserve 
components of the uniformed services.  
• Health Sciences Collegiate Program (HSCP). Two-year scholarship 
program in designated health professions to complete degree/certification 
requirements and obtain Reserve officer commission in the active duty 
component of the Dental Corps upon graduation.  Participants are 
considered enlisted with full pay and benefits. 
                                                 
14 Navy Department, Administration of Health Professions Accession Programs (HPAP), 
OPNAVINST 1110.1A (Washington, DC: February 2007), 2-3. 
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• Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP). HPSP is an Inactive 
Ready Reserve program for students accepted to or enrolled in an 
accredited training program leading to a health profession degree. HPSP 
provides full tuition scholarship for dental school and includes funding for 
required books, fees and equipment. Additionally, a monthly stipend is 
provided.  This Inactive Ready Reserve program permits graduates of the 
HPSP to obtain graduate professional education in accredited civilian 
institutions.   
• Financial Assistance Program (FAP). FAP is an Inactive Ready Reserve 
Program for physicians or dentists currently accepted to or enrolled in an 
accredited residency or fellowship program progressing toward a specialty 
that has been designated as critical to Department of Defense (DOD). 
• Health Professions Loan Repayment Program (HPLRP). HPLRP is an 
active duty and Reserve program used to recruit qualified health 
professionals in specific specialties. Under the HPLRP, the Navy repays 
all or a portion of participant-incurred educational loan obligations. 
Table 2 shows accessions for new dentists in four programs over the past four 
fiscal years. 
 
Table 2.   Dental Officers by Accession Program: Accessions Achieved as a Percent of 
Accession Goal15 
 
 Fiscal Year 
Program 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 2005 (%) 2006 (%) 
DA 13/31      (42) 10/25     (40) 9/15        (60) 5/15           (33)
HSCP 15/25      (60) 23/30     (77) 22/26      (85) 30/30       (100)
FAP 4/6          (67) 1/6         (17) 0/6            (0) 2/6             (33)
HPSP 80/80    (100) 97/98     (99) 69/85      (81) 57/57       (100)
TOTAL 112/142     (79) 131/159    (82) 100/132     (76) 94/126      (75) 
 
Fiscal year 2006 represents the worst year of the four only with 75% of the total 
goal met.  During this four- year time frame, HPSP brought in the largest number of 
dentists and had the most success in terms of reaching the largest percentage of its annual 
goals; conversely FAP was the least successful at bringing dentists into the Navy.   
 
                                                 
15 CDR Richard Houser, MSC, USN, email to author 14 December 2006. 
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4. Military Pay  
Military pay is congressionally approved, based on rank and years of service.  
Increases in pay occur based on promotions and years of service.  Based on the military 
pay scale, a military service member may, therefore, expect an increase in pay every two 
years even without an increase in rank.  Military compensation also includes allowances 
for housing (with and without dependents) and for subsistence.   
Dentists are also eligible for various bonuses to alleviate the military-civilian 
wage gap.  Depending on the officer’s specialty, rank, years of service, and contractual 
commitment, thousands of dollars may be added to a dentist’s annual income.  A 
description of each of the specialty pays follows: 
a. Variable Special Pay (VSP) 
This bonus is available to those dental officers with at least one year of 
active duty service remaining, unless the officer falls under one of the exceptions outlined 
in Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations.  No additional contractual 
obligation is needed to be eligible for this special pay.  Table 3 shows the annual rates 
based on creditable years of service. 
Table 3.   Variable Special Pay16 
 
VARIABLE SPECIAL PAY 
YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE SPECIAL PAY AMOUNT  
($$ / YEAR) 
Less than 3* 3,000 
At least 3 but less than 6** 7,000 
At least 6 but less than 8 7,000 
At least 8 but less than 12 12,000 
At least 12 but less than 14 10,000 
At least 14 but less than 18 9,000 
At least 18 or more 8,000 
Above O-6 7,000 
*If undergoing training  **Not undergoing internship training 
                                                 
16 Navy Department, “Fiscal Year 2007 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery Special Pay Page, 2007, 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-
ABBA0925B2764081&docid=10766 (Last Accessed 16 January 2007). 
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b. Additional Special Pay (ASP) 
A dental officer not participating in an internship, fellowship or initial 
dental residency training, and possessing a current unrestricted license is eligible for 
ASP.17  An officer must agree to remain on active duty for at least 12 months to receive 
this money.18  Payments are disbursed monthly based on the years of creditable service 
and commence on the contract’s execution date.  Table 4 shows the annual rates for ASP. 
Table 4.   Additional Special Pay19 
 
ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PAY 
YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE SPECIAL PAY AMOUNT  
($$ / YEAR) 
Less than 3 4,000 
At least 3 but less than 10 6,000 
At least 10 or more 15,000 
 
c. Board Certification Pay (BCP) 
A dental officer who is eligible for VSP and who holds a “current, valid, 
unrestricted license or approved waiver and is board certified, by a Navy recognized 
board, is entitled to BCP.”20  BCP is in addition to any other pay and allowances the 
officer is eligible to receive, and payment is based on years of creditable service.  Table 5 
shows the bonus levels for eligible dentists. 
 
Table 5.   Board Certified Pay21 
                                                 
17 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures – 
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington, DC: 2005) 7. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Navy Department, “Fiscal Year 2007 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery Special Pay Page, 2007, 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-
ABBA0925B2764081&docid=10766 (Last Accessed 16 January 2007). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Navy Department, “Fiscal Year 2007 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery Special Pay Page, 2007, 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-
ABBA0925B2764081&docid=10766 (16 January 2007). 
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Board Certified Pay 
Years of Creditable Service Pay Level ($)
Less than 10  2,500
With at least 10 but less than 12 3,500
With at least 12 but less than 14 4,000
With at least 14 but less than 18 5,000
With at least 18 or more 6,000
 
d. Dental Officer Multiyear Retention Bonus (DOMRB) 
Dental officers may receive the DOMRB for agreeing to extend their 
active duty obligation by two, three, or four years.22  This bonus is directed towards the 
experienced clinical specialist and eligibility is targeted to a dental officer below the rank 
of O-7 who has a valid, unrestricted license with at least eight years of creditable service, 
or who has completed his/her active duty service commitment for dental education and 
training.23  Payment is received annually on the anniversary date of the agreement.24  
Table 6 illustrates the payment schedule for DOMRB. 
Table 6.   Dental Officers Multiyear Retention Bonus25 
 













Oral Maxillofacial Surgeons 25,000 38,000 50,000 
Comprehensive/Operative Dentistry 20,000 30,000 40,000 
Endodontics 20,000 30,000 40,000 
Prosthodontics 20,000 30,000 40,000 
Orthodontics 18,000 27,000 35,000 








Pediatric Dentistry 18,000 27,000 35,000 




25 Navy Department, “Fiscal Year 2007 Dental Officer Special Pay Plan,” Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery Special Pay Page, 2007, 
http://navymedicine.med.navy.mil/default.cfm?seltab=bumed&ecmid=93E9008D-802E-D019-
ABBA0925B2764081&docid=10766 (16 January 2007). 
 10













Public Health Dentistry 18,000 27,000 35,000 
Temporomandibular Dysfunction 
(TMD) 
18,000 27,000 35,000 
Dental Research 18,000 27,000 35,000 
Exodontia (Advanced Clinical 
Practice) 
13,000 19,000 25,000 
Endodontics (Advanced Clinical 
Practice) 
13,000 19,000 25,000 
General Dentistry [Comprehensive 
Dentistry] (Advanced Clinical 
Practice) 
13,000 19,000 25,000 
Periodontics (Advanced Clinical 
Practice) 
13,000 19,000 25,000 
Prosthodontics (Advanced Clinical 
Practice) 
13,000 19,000 25,000 
 
e. Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
Designed to be an incentive to keep critically needed medical 
professionals in the service, the CSRB was authorized in the 2000 National Defense 
Act.26  However, it was not funded until 2003.  Those dentists, not in graduate 
professional education, choosing to extend their active duty obligation by 12 months 
were eligible to receive a one-time payment of $12,000. 
5. Characteristics of New Dental School Graduates 
The most recent ADA survey of dental graduates involves the graduating class of 
2004.  Not surprisingly, the demographics of class of 2004 are similar to those of the 
Navy general dentists evaluated in Chapter III, because there are so few years separating 
these groups of individuals.  Table 7 compares the class of 2004 with Navy Dental Corps 
Officers commissioned in 1998-2001. 
                                                 
26 Department of Defense, Financial Management Regulation Military Pay Policy and Procedures – 
Active Duty and Reserve Pay, DoDFMR 7000-14R, Volume 7A, Chapter 6 (Washington, DC: 2005) 12. 
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Table 7.   2004 Dental Graduates versus Navy General Dentists Commissioned 1998-
200127 
 
Characteristic 2004 Dental Graduate Navy General Dentist28 
Age, average (years) 29.1 28.2 
Age Range (years) 23 through 52 24 through 47 
Over 30 years old (%) 20.7 20.9 
Male to Female Ratio 59.1 : 40.9 72.5 : 27.5 
 
Nearly 92 percent of the 2004 graduates responding to the survey left school with 
some level of education debt; a debt that on average tallied $131,200.29   This debt load 
was the highest on record and represented a 27 percent increase over the class of 2000.30  
These figures suggest graduates will need to seek positions with compensation or benefit 
programs that can best resolve their indebtedness.   
The ADA reported that of the 2004 graduates responding to the survey, more than 
78 percent claimed general practice dentistry as their area of practice, research, or 
administration area.  Nearly 20 (19.2) percent of all respondents are independent dentists 
who own their own or share ownership of a dental practice and over 68 percent are 
identified as non-owner dentists.31  Almost 6 (5.8) percent of the graduates are employed 
with the armed forces.   
 
 
                                                 
27 The American Dental Association, Survey Center, The 2005 Survey of Dental Graduates (Chicago, 
IL), September 2006, 18(4). 
28 BUMIS data.  
29 The American Dental Association, Survey Center, The 2005 Survey of Dental Graduates (Chicago, 
IL), September 2006, 16. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 13. 
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6. Chapter Overview 
This paper is organized into six sections to provide a logical description of the 
behaviors of general dentists as they decide to stay or leave the Navy.  Chapter I provides 
background information on the Dental Corps; its history, composition, accession 
programs, military compensation and special pays.  Chapter II provides a literature 
review of different studies of the retention of Navy medical and non-medical 
communities.  It also includes a review of auction theory literature.  Chapter III discusses 
the data and methodology used to analyze general dentists, retention behavior.  Chapter 
IV defines the variables used in the analysis and reports the results of the regression.  
Chapter V describes a theoretical application of auction theory to general dentists at their 
initial decision to continue their military service. Chapter VI reports the findings of the 
regression outcomes and results of the experiment. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. RETENTION STUDIES 
The rising cost of healthcare is a major concern to Americans, and this concern is 
true for the military as well.  Not surprisingly, the personnel costs for professional 
medical personnel are increasing too.  Accession, training, and retention of these people 
are expensive activities, and medical skills are in high demand in the civilian workplace.  
Consequently, there exists much literature regarding their attrition, training, and 
retention.   
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 directed the 
Secretary of Defense to review and then report to Congress on the adequacy of the 
special pays and bonuses for medical corps officers and other health professionals.32  
Subsequently, The Center for Naval Analysis published the Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress.  In this paper the authors 
noted that the Department of Defense’s (DoD) military health system (MHS) has two 
missions.  The first is to ensure medical capabilities are available to support combat 
operations and that uniformed members of the armed forces are healthy.33  The second 
mission is to provide a “healthcare benefit” to more than 6 million other beneficiaries.34  
As such, it is an expensive process to access, train, and keep needed medical 
professionals to satisfy these missions.  These challenges are compounded when there is a 
high demand for these professionals in the civilian work force as well.35 
The purpose of the paper was to determine if uniformed healthcare professionals 
were being adequately compensated.  The authors wrote, “We believe the answer lies in 
                                                 
32 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 






the MHS’ ability to fill both its peace time and active component readiness requirements 
with the right professionals, the right skill mix, and the right years of experience from 
today’s force and future accessions.”36  If positions systematically went unfilled, or were 
not assigned to persons with the appropriate rank / experience, then special pays would 
need to be adjusted.  To determine if military medical professions were adequately 
compensated, the authors had to answer several underlying questions, such as:37 
• Has retention increased or decreased in the last ten year? 
• Does an adequate inventory exist to meet both readiness and peace time 
roles? 
• Does a balance exist between junior, middle, and senior personnel? 
• How much does the civilian-military pay gap affect retention? 
Based on information from DMDC and HMPDS, the authors described a 
significant force structure change in the MHS’ Dental Corps between 1991 and 2000.  
Through downsizing, the number of military dentists was reduced 28 percent in ten 
years.38  Of those reductions, the numbers of general dentists were cut by 38% in the 
DoD and by 40% in the Navy.39  Furthermore, among general dentists there was an 
increase in the number of O-3 dentists but a significant reduction of O-4s.40  
In terms of analyzing military dentist retention, the low number of O-4s in the 
inventory is not a surprise, given that dentists who opt to leave the Navy do so prior to 
the eighth year of service.41  Typically, Navy DC Officers are eligible for promotion to 
Lieutenant Commander approximately in the fifth or sixth year of service.  However, the 
authors noted that they “can not directly conclude that it is more difficult to retain 
dentists now than ten years ago because there is no consistent or systematic yearly change 
                                                 
36 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 
Uniformed and Private-Sector Health Care Professionals),Center for Naval Analysis, [Washington, D.C.: 
2002] 2. 
37 Ibid., 3. 
38 Ibid., 114. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 121. 
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in the survival curves over the last decade.”42  Moreover, the dramatic downsizing 
experienced during these years complicates the analysis and distorts the conclusion. 
Commenting that “retention rates should be created using initial obligated service 
data,” the authors attempted to build a data set of newly accessed dentists.43  However , 
the authors were unable to obtain accurate obligated service data from DMDC, because 
the field was frequently blank or had been over written with new data for a subsequent 
obligation (for example, promotion, pay contract, etc.).  Consequently, the authors 
created a longitudinal data file that isolated new uniformed dental officer accessions in 
fiscal year 1992 through 2000, and assumed that if a dentist did not exist in the previous 
year’s data, then that dentist was a new accession.44  This procedure was done for both 
general dentists and specialists.   
After examining fiscal year (FY) 1992-1996 cohorts, the authors discovered that 
gender does not influence retention in any significant manner.45  Retention rates 
remained nearly equal across military services.  Not surprisingly, the analysis showed 
that after three or more years in a specialty, specialists have higher retention rates than 
general dentists across all services.46  Specialists with this level of experience have 
demonstrated a greater commitment to the military.  Table 8 illustrates survival rates for 




                                                 
42 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 
Uniformed and Private-Sector Health Care Professionals),Center for Naval Analysis, [Washington, D.C.: 
2002] 121. 
43 Ibid., 123. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 124. 
46 Ibid., 126.  Dental specialists are normally selected from the general dentist community, so these 
individuals have already completed their initial active duty obligation and specialty training.  
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Table 8.   MHS Dental Corps Cohort Survival Rates (FY 1992 through 1996)47 
 
MHS Dental Corps Cohort Survival Rates (%), FY 1992 – 1996 
General Dentists 1 yr 2 yr 3 yr 4 yr 5 yr 6 yr 7 yr 8 yr 
Navy 96 95 73 51 43 36 33 31 
Army 94 89 61 53 47 43 39 36 
Air Force 99 96 64 47 42 39 34 28 
 
Table 8 shows a significant decrease in dentists beginning in year three.  The 
Navy only retains 73 percent of its dentists by the third year of service.  Perhaps more 
striking is that by the next year (year four), the survival rate for military dentists is 51 
percent.  Table 9 illustrates the aggregate MHS Dental Corps cohort four year survival 
rates by specialty.   
 
Table 9.   Aggregate MHS Dental Corps Cohort Four-Year Survival Rates (%) by 
Specialty (FY 1992-1996)48 
 
Aggregate MHS Dental Corps Cohort Four-Year Survival Rates (%) by 
Specialty (FY 1992-1996( 
 Percent Surviving After 
General Dentists 1 yr 2 yr 3 yr 4 yr 5 yr 6 yr 7 yr 8 yr 
1992 98 95 66 54 43 43 38 35 
1993 98 96 64 54 46 39 36  
1994 92 92 70 53 44 39   
1995 97 96 74 55 48    
1996 95 92 63 39     
Approximately 30 percent of the general dentists leave military service at year 
three and nearly 50 percent leave after four years of service.  However, across cohorts 
there is little variability in the survival rates which makes predicting retention 
improvements challenging. 
The authors also examined the effect of pay on retention.  The American Dental 
Association (ADA) income survey reported the average net income for general dentists 
                                                 
47 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 
Uniformed and Private-Sector Health Care Professionals),Center for Naval Analysis, [Washington, D.C.: 
2002] 125. 
48 Ibid., 127.  For the purpose of this paper, only the results regarding general dentists were illustrated. 
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for 1992 through 1998.  Based on this information, the authors concluded a “significant 
reduction in pay parity” existed between uniformed military dentists and civilian 
dentists.49  To compare military and civilian wages, the authors estimated the maximum 
potential pay uniformed dentists could receive given characteristics such as grade, 
specialty, and years of service.50  Only cash compensation was considered with military 
pay defined as regular military compensation (RMC), statutory compensation and 
discretionary pay.51  Table 10 shows the MHS and civilian dentists’ earning ratios. 
 
Table 10.   MHS and Civilian Dentists Earning Ratios by Years of Commissioned 
Service52 
 
MHS and Civilian General Dentists Earning Ratios by YOCS 
Fiscal Year 5 10 15 20 25 Avg 
1991 .55 .64 .74 .85 .92 .55 
1992 .53 .62 .72 .82 .90 .54 
1993 .49 .58 .67 .77 .85 .52 
1994 .46 .54 .63 .71 .80 .49 
1995 .45 .53 .62 .70 .78 .46 
1996 .46 .54 .62 .70 .78 .48 
1997 .47 .53 .59 .67 .75 .48 
1998 .43 .54 .63 .69 .75 .47 
                                                 
49 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 
Uniformed and Private-Sector Health Care Professionals),Center for Naval Analysis, [Washington, D.C.: 
2002] 128.  
50 Ibid., 131. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 133. For the purpose of this paper only general dentist information was illustrated from the 
original text. 
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MHS and Civilian General Dentists Earning Ratios by YOCS 
Fiscal Year 5 10 15 20 25 Avg 
1999 .41 .53 .59 .68 .75 .44 
2000 .41 .54 .62 .67 .80 .45 
Pay Gap ($1,000s) 70.2 57.9 46.9 27.5 27.5 69.2 
 
Table 10 suggests that military dentists are paid significantly less than their 
civilian counterparts, and the greatest disparity is at the junior dentist level. 
Using more survival analysis techniques, the authors estimated the attrition rate 
for general dentists.  The regression analysis controlled for several variables that could be 
correlated with attrition, such as gender, service, rank, years remaining until retirement, 
and if currently enrolled in a training program.53  They did not control for accession 
source because DMDC data had changed over time and the quality of the accession 
source data was questionable.   
Based on their analysis, the authors reported that “a $10,000 increase in 
compensation leads to a 7.2 percentage increase in the attrition rate.”54  In other words, if 
the dental corps experienced a 10 percent attrition rate for its general dentists, a $10,000 
reduction in the pay gap would reduce the attrition rate to only 9.3 percent.  Therefore, 
the authors concluded that a $10,000 increase in compensation has minimal effect on 
retention.55  The authors offer a caveat for this conclusion by noting that this conclusion 
is based on aggregate data which may be affected by the inclusion of those nearing 
retirement, and these individuals made the decision to stay in the military many years 
ago.  Although the analysis does not show a significant movement in the attrition rate for 
                                                 
53 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 





all the dental corps with a $10,000 pay increase, it does suggest that a decrease in the pay 
gap does have a positive effect on attrition.56   
Given this analysis of military compensation, the authors sought to determine if 
the dental corps could fill its peace time billets and readiness requirements with the 
proper skill mix and years of experience.  Comparing manning levels between 1993 and 
2003, the authors determined Navy dental manning rose to 99 percent from 94 percent 
over this period of time.57  After looking at readiness requirements, the authors concluded 
that the services would meet their readiness requirements for the near future.58 
Besides satisfying billet and readiness requirements, the services must have the 
proper number of dentists with the appropriate levels of experience.  The services were 
asked to supply the ideal force structure.  Only the Air Force supplied their version.  
Using the Air Force model, the authors concluded that that a “trough” exists in the dental 
corps; meaning that military dentists are either “very junior or very senior.”59   
In conclusion, the authors determined that military compensation may not be 
adequate because of the significant shortage of O-4s (mid-career dentists) in the MHS.  
This suggests that the current compensation levels / strategies do not provide sufficient 
incentives to retain an adequate number of dentists beyond their initial active duty 
obligation.60 
In another study, Alan Christian sought to determine the critical factors 
influencing retention of junior Navy Dentists after completing their initial obligation.61  
Using data supplied from the BUMED Manpower Information System (BUMIS), 
Christian analyzed dental officers who started in or continued through 1994 and had at 
                                                 
56 Shayne Brannman, Michele Almendarez, Cori Rattelman, and Elaine Scherer, Health Professions’ 
Retention-Accession Incentives Study Report to Congress (Phase 1: Compensation Comparison of Selected 
Uniformed and Private-Sector Health Care Professionals),Center for Naval Analysis, [Washington, D.C.: 
2002] 136. 
57 Ibid., 140. 
58 Ibid., 141. 
59 Ibid., 143. 
60 Ibid., 144-145. 
61 Alan B Christian, Influences on the Retention of Residency-Trained and Non-Residency Trained 
Navy Dental Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School, [Monterey, CA.: 2004] 1. 
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least one record at the rank of Lieutenant.62  Random samples were drawn from officers 
who were assigned to two cohorts; residency trained and non-residency trained.63  Each 
sample group consisted of 100 individuals who served on active duty between 1994 
through 2003. 
Christian reported on the demographics of the Dental Corps.  Male officers 
represented 91.2 percent of the total sample and nearly 79 percent of all dentists were 
Caucasian.64 More dentists were Lieutenants (38.1 percent) than any other grade, 
followed by Commanders (25.5 percent).65  Eighty-seven (43.5 percent) of the 200 
sampled officers were accessed through direct procurement.66  Of these dentists, more 
than 58 percent received some residency training while on active duty and 71 percent 
stayed in the Navy more than one year beyond their obligated commitment.67 
Christian utilized nine independent variables in his logistic regressions.  They 
were gender, commission source, subspecialty, operational tours, tours outside the 
continental United States, age when first paid as a dentist, number of years before 
residency, and ethnicity.68  Christian learned from the results of the non-residency sample 
that female dental officers were more likely to leave the military upon completion of their 
obligated service, and that 100 percent of recall officers and 73.1 percent of dental 
students remained on active duty more than 12 months beyond their commitment.69  
Conversely, nearly 80 percent of Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program  
 
 
                                                 
62 Alan B. Christian, Influences on the Retention of Residency-Trained and Non-Residency Trained 
Navy Dental Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School, [Monterey, CA.: 2004] 16. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 23. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 25. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 26. 
69 Ibid., 27. 
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(HPSP) recipients left the service within one year of their commitment.70  Of the 79 
general dentists, only 36 (45.6 percent) opted to extend past their required obligated 
service.71   
Interestingly, in terms of racial identity, Christian discovered that 75 percent of 
the officers classified themselves as not belonging to any specific ethnic group.  Whether 
the DC Officers did not wish to provide that information or could not relate to the ethnic 
choices is undeterminable.  However, the regression results showed that 52 percent of 
those officers stayed more than one year beyond their obligation.72 
The results from the regression on the residency sample were somewhat different 
than the non-residency sample.  Although females were more likely to exit military 
service, nearly 73 percent of direct accessions and 75 percent of AFHPSP accessed 
dentists continued their military service after completing their obligatory commitment.73  
Table 11 illustrates the statistically significant variables in Christian’s model.     
 
Table 11.   Statistically Significant Variables74 
 
Statistically Significant Variables 
Variable Non Residency Residency 
Gender X X 
Age when first paid as dentist  X 
Commission Source X  
Ethnicity   
Operational Tours X  
Yrs before Residency  X 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Alan B. Christian, Influences on the Retention of Residency-Trained and Non-Residency Trained 
Navy Dental Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School, [Monterey, CA.: 2004] 29. 
72 Ibid., 32. 
73 Ibid., 30. 
74 Ibid., 53-55. 
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Based on his findings, Christian recommended recruiting more trained dentists 
and offering more training opportunities for general dentists earlier in their career to 
address some of the retention issues.  Furthermore, he suggested that dentists in their 
obligation period should be assigned operational tours “only when necessary.”75 
As CNA and Christian in their research have shown, retention is currently a 
challenge for the Dental Corps.  If unable to retain the appropriate number of dentists, the 
DC will need to seek other methods to provide oral care to DoD beneficiaries.  Work 
done by Richard Stacey suggests that contracting clinical dental specialists for the Dental 
Corps, instead of “growing them” via uniformed general dentists would be cost 
beneficial.  The motivation for his research was the rising costs of recruitment and 
training compounded by the Navy’s inability to meet accession goals.  After examining 
the major costs involved in recruiting, accessing, training, and retaining general dentists 
to be specialists, Stacey’s cost-benefit analysis model predicted a savings greater than 
$200,000 over a 10-year period in the Navy.76  Based on his findings, Stacey 
recommended contracting civilian endodontists for “non-essential billets at all CONUS 
shore-based medical treatment facilities (MTFs), and increasing bonuses and specialty 
pays.77   
Outside of the dental community, but still within the Navy medical department, 
Michael Bristol conducted a multivariate analysis on medical officers to determine if 
OPTEMPO has a significant effect on their retention behavior.  The Navy Medical Corps 
faces some of the same accession, training, and retention issues faced by the Dental 
Corps. As Bristol explains, “Given the extensive investment in human capital in a 
resource constrained setting, the Navy can ill-afford for retention to persistently be lower 
than planned levels.”78  Bristol continues to describe why the manning levels for 
                                                 
75 Alan B. Christian, Influences on the Retention of Residency-Trained and Non-Residency Trained 
Navy Dental Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School, [Monterey, CA.: 2004] 56. 
76 Richard C. Stacey, Navy Dental Corps Contract or Uniform: Study of Factors Influencing Business 
Case Analyses, Naval Postgraduate School, [Monterey, CA.: 2006] 63. 
77 Ibid., 68. 
78 Raymond Bristol, Effect of Increased Operational Tempo (post 9/11) on the Retention of Navy 
Medical Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School [Monterey, CA.: 2006] 8. 
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physicians have been suffering, “The principal impediment to date, has been the disparity 
between military compensation and comparable civilian earnings, the civilian-military 
pay gap.”79   
Using demographic and military experience variables, Bristol developed 
difference-in-difference models to analyze the decisions of general medical officers and 
medical specialists prior to and after the events of September 11, 2001.  Bristol 
discovered that years of service, years of service squared, race, being a single parent, 
being a flight surgeon or Undersea Medicine Physician, and OPTEMPO are significant 
factors for a General Medical Officer (GMO) in his or her decision to stay or leave.  
Gender, marital/dependency, and deployments were not significant factors.80   
Not surprisingly, the general medical officer results were somewhat different than 
those of the specialists.  The data suggested that the following significant factors in the 
retention decision for specialty trained physicians were different than GMOs: 
deployments, surgical specialties, occupational specialties, assigned to Naval Medical 
Center San Diego.81  The common factors were years of service, years of service squared, 
deployments, and deployments post fiscal year 2002.82 
Bristol concluded from his logistic regression models that deployments do not 
significantly affect GMO retention decisions.  However, specialists are more likely to 
discontinue military service with increased deployments.  Bristol’s GMO results changed 
when he utilized a difference in difference model, then, the output showed GMOs who 
deploy are “considerably less likely to continue military service”83 if they were deployed 
after 2002.  The same held true for specialists. 
The reviewed literature acknowledges that the retention of military Medical 
Department Officers, including Dental Corps officers, is a concern for the Navy.  The 
                                                 
79 Raymond Bristol, Effect of Increased Operational Tempo (post 9/11) on the Retention of Navy 
Medical Corps Officers, Naval Postgraduate School [Monterey, CA.: 2006] 8. 
80 Ibid., 63-65. 
81 Ibid., 71. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 82. 
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literature has attempted to describe the retention behaviors of professionals who face 
disincentives to stay in the military and strong incentives to join the civilian work force.  
The next section provides the background and conceptual foundation underlying auction 
theory; a tool that may be useful in countering the attraction of civilian employment.  
B. AUCTION THEORY CONCEPTS AND LITERATURE   
1. Defining Auction  
Auctions are not new to the business world.  Companies such as Sotheby’s and 
Christies are world renown for their auctions of high end commodities.  However, with 
the advent of the internet and eBay, auctions have become an activity in which everyone 
can participate provided one has access to the world wide web.  McAfee and McMillan 
define an auction as “a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants.”84  In 
simpler terms, an auction has the potential to set an appropriate price for a good or 
service when the price of that commodity is unknown.85   
2. Standard Types of Auctions 
There are four basic types of auctions; the ascending bid, the descending bid, the 
first-price sealed bid and the second-price sealed bid.86  The ascending bid is commonly 
called the English, or forward, auction, whereas the descending bid is also known as the 
Dutch auction.  These auctions can also be organized as forward auction, with many 
buyers and one seller, or reverse auctions, with many sellers and one buyer.  To prevent 
confusion, from this point on, this paper shall utilize the more common names for these 
types of auctions. 
 
                                                 
84 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 
XXV (Summer 1987), 701. 
85 William Gates, “Innovations in Special Pay and Bonuses,” Presentation, 30 June 2006. 
86 Paul Klemperer, “Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,” Journal of Economic Surveys 13, no. 
3 (Summer 1999), 229. 
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a. English Auctions 
English auctions are perhaps the most familiar type of auctions in the 
United States.  There is a single seller with multiple bidders, and the price is gradually 
increased based on input from bidders.  Bidders drop out of the auction as the price 
increases beyond what they desire to pay for the good.  The highest bidder wins the 
object or service.   
b. Dutch Auctions 
Dutch auctions operate the opposite of English auctions.  In this 
circumstance, there is still a single seller with multiple buyers.  An auctioneer (buyer) 
begins with a high price and lowers the price until a bidder (buyer) accepts.   
c. First-Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
First-price sealed bids auctions involve independent bids without the 
knowledge of how others are bidding.  Bids are kept secret until the winner is announced.  
The winner pays the amount he or she bid. 
d. Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions 
Second-price sealed bid auctions are also called “Vickrey” auctions.  They 
operate in the same manner as first price sealed bid auctions, except the winning bidder 
pays the second highest bid, or second price. 
3. Auction Format Factors 
Auctions are held with different objectives. The goal sought by a seller, for 
example to maximize profits, welfare, or even social efficiency, may help determine the 
type of auction needed to achieve that goal.  However, there are seven other factors that 
need to be considered; revenue equivalence, risk tolerance among bidders, collusion, 
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reserve prices, private information, and the number of bidders. 87  These factors have all 
been discussed elsewhere for a similar context; only revenue equivalence will be 
discussed here. 
a. Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
Donald Campbell defined revenue equivalence theory as, given that “each 
of the n agents is risk neutral and each has a privately known value independently drawn 
from a common probability distribution, then all standard auctions have the bidders 
making the same expected payments at equilibrium, given their respective values, and the 
seller’s expected revenue is the same for all standard auctions.”88  Basically, the theorem 
states that utilizing any of the four common auction formats will, on average, result in the 
same amount of profit provided the following conditions exist; bidders are risk neutral; 
bidders independently concluded the value of the good; the bidders are symmetric (values 
are drawn from similar probability distributions); and payment is a function of bids alone.   
These four conditions, or assumptions, are also referred to as the 
Benchmark Model.89  To relax any of these four conditions means that the four auction 
formats will not provide the same level of profits.  Therefore, depending on the seller’s 
objective, s/he would need to select an auction that would maximize that particular goal.  
This research assumes that the Benchmark Model holds, so auction design is not 
discussed in detail.  However, this research will indicate the implications of violating the 
Benchmark Model assumptions. 
4. An Application of Military Bonuses and Auction Theory  
William Filip analyzed the manner in which Navy bonuses are distributed, and he 
recommended changes to the bonus program structure that could improve recruitment 
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and retention.90  His primary research goal was to identify a bonus structure that would 
sufficiently supply quality Naval Officers to meet recruitment and retention goals.   
Simultaneously, he wanted his format to be cost effective and so flexible that the Navy 
could compete with civilian labor market forces.  Translated into simpler terms, during 
periods when the economy is strong and civilian wages are high, the Navy should expect 
to pay a higher bonus to keep its already trained personnel.  Conversely, when the 
economy is weak and wages are lower, than a bonus may not even be needed.   
Filip reviewed several targeted bonuses for the aviation, submarine, and surface 
warfare communities.  He noted that each respective program was designed to either 
recruit people into needed areas or retain those already trained and who are in high 
demand by the civilian labor market. 
Filip noted that the Navy uses signaling theory to identify the potential success of 
an individual officer.  Some examples of signaling are the officer’s fitness reports 
(fitreps) and “attainment of key promotion points” such as the completion of Joint 
Professional Military Education and /or achieving community qualifications.91  An 
individual with solid fitreps and who obtains professional qualifications suggests, or 
signals, to Navy leadership s/he may be someone committed to staying in military 
service.   
Filip’s designed bonus structure permits officers to signal their stay/leave 
intentions by offering different obligation length contracts to the service.92  Officers 
determine the bonus amounts for each respective contract by participating in a reverse, 
second-price auction.   One of the benefits of such a structure is that “the signaling aspect 
of the program provides the Navy with insight into personnel manning trends, while  
 
 
                                                 
90 William N. Filip, Improving the Navy’s Officer Bonus Program Effectiveness, Naval Postgraduate 
School [Monterey, CA.; 2006] 36. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., 39. 
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allowing individuals to express their preference financially.”93  With an auction-based 
bonus format, competition and honest bidding are ensured while bonus levels mirror the 
overall economy and job market situation. 
Filip’s bonus program allows for two contract lengths.  The contract with the 
longer duration offers a set bonus amount based on a winning bid.  The shorter contract is 
for one-year and is designed to capture those officers who are uncertain about their long 
term commitment to the service.  In a given year, the one-year contract may pay more 
than the longer contract, but a one-year bonus may not be available the following year.   
This flexibility allows the Navy the opportunity to achieve force shaping and to match the 
forces in effect in the civilian market. 
Those officers with lower opportunity costs will agree to a longer contract with a 
lower level bonus.  Officers with high opportunity costs may agree to a one-year contract 
with a high level bonus, and assume the risk that a bonus with a short term obligation 
might not be available the following year.   
Figure 1 is an illustration of Filip’s bonus format, offering two bonuses.  One 
bonus is worth $15,000 per year contingent on a seven-year commitment.  The second 
bonus is worth $25,000 in exchange for only one additional year of service.  Filip 
mathematically demonstrates that not all officers will chose the short term contract.  For 
this paper’s purpose, suffice it to say that not everyone will select the higher bonus, 
because it comes with more risk.  For example, because of the program’s flexible design, 
the following year may see the one-year commitment bonus fall below $15,000, which is 
the bonus level for the seven-year commitment.   
 
Figure 1.   An Example of Filip’s Bonus Format94   
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
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III. DATA SOURCES, GENERAL METHODOLOGY, 
PRELIMINARY DATA, AND ANALYTICAL METHOD 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Bureau of Medicine Information System (BUMIS) 
BUMIS is the information system utilized by BUMED to collect and maintain 
general, demographic, and professional information about its Medical Officers.95  The 
original data set obtained for this study contained annual inventory files of all dentists 
from 1984 through 2005.  Additionally, each respective year had a loss file, listing those 
dentists who were released from active duty service.   
This research analyzes only general dentists commissioned between 1998 and 
2001.  All specialists and general dentists commissioned before 1998 and after 2002 were 
deleted from the data set.  Eight dentists categorized as Recalled were also eliminated 
from the analysis since they had opted not to be on active duty full time.  Two additional 
dentists accessed through the Financial Assistance Program were taken out of the study 
as well.  From the remaining general dentists, two cohorts were created based on 
commissioning year.  Each cohort represented two years of newly active commissioned 
Dental Corps Officers.  The data elements utilized for this research include age (at time 
of commissioning), gender, race, and accession source.   
                                                                                                                                                 
94 William N. Filip, Improving the Navy’s Officer Bonus Program Effectiveness, Naval Postgraduate 
School [Monterey, CA.; 2006] 42. 
95 Data provided by the Dental Corps Personnel Plans Analyst working in the Navy Medicine, 
Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education Command Directorate for Workforce Management located in 
Bethesda, Maryland. 
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B. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
1.   End of Initial Obligation 
A critical retention decision point for a service member is at the end of the initial 
obligation.  The type of accession program used to enter military service affects the 
length of initial obligation.  The minimum length of service is two years and normally 
applies only to those dentists categorized as direct commissions.   
Any general dentist who stayed beyond four years of commissioned service was 
considered a “stayer.”  Because of the varying obligations, and since not all officers 
separate from the service exactly at the end of their requirement, this four year criterion 
covers all obligation periods from all accession sources, and provides some additional 
time to separate prior to being considered a “stayer.”  Any general dentist not completing 
four years of service was considered a “leaver.” 
C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
The final data set consisted of 516 observations after applying the constraints 
mentioned above.  Table 12 shows the number of observations by accession source in 
each active commission year cohort. Over all accession sources, 277 general dentists 
entered the Navy in 1998 and 1999, while only 239 entered in 2000 and 2001, a decline 
of 13.72 percent.   
 
Table 12.   Number of Dentists By Accession Source96 
 
Accession Source 1998-1999 Cohort 2000-2001 Cohort Total 
Dental Student 39 24 63 
Direct Commission 31 17 48 
HSCP 84 56 140 
HPSP 123 142 265 
Total 277 239 516 
 
                                                 
96 Table created by author utilizing general dentist information from BUMIS. 
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1. Description of General Dentists by Entry Cohort 
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for all the general dentists in the sample 
and by entry cohort. It offers insight into the characteristics of general dentists that will 
be used in the multivariate analysis.   
 








Accession Source (%)    
Dental Student 14.08 10.04 12.21 
Direct Commission 11.19 7.11 9.30 
HSCP 30.32 23.43 27.13 
HPSP 44.40 59.41 51.36 
Gender (%)    
Female 30.32 24.27 27.52 
Male 69.68 75.73 72.48 
Race (%)    
Asian or American Indian 11.55 16.32 13.76 
Black 3.97 3.35 3.68 
No Response / Didn’t know 8.30 7.95 8.14 
White 76.17 72.38 74.42 
Age     
Under 30 79.06 79.08 79.07 
Between 30 and 39 20.22 20.50 20.35 
Over 40  .72 .42 .58 
Retention (%)    
Stay 53.79 57.74 55.62 
 
a. Accession Source 
HPSP accessed more dentists than any other program, 51.36 percent of 
total accessions for the 1998 – 2001 period.  HSCP accessed the second most dentists, 
accounting for 27.13 percent of total accessions during these four years.   The direct 
commission program brought in the fewest dentists, representing only 9.30 percent of all 
                                                 
97 Table created by author utilizing general dentist information from BUMIS.  
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accessed dentists in this time frame.  A comparison of accession source distributions 
between the 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 cohorts shows that HPSP accessions increased in 
2000-2001 while all other programs reflect a decrease in accessions.  
b. Gender 
Males represent 72.48 percent of the accessed general dentists for the 1998 
– 2001 period.  In the 2000 - 2001 cohort, males increased their representation over the 
previous cohort by nearly six percent to 75.73 percent. 
c. Race 
Whites represent 74.42 percent of the accessed general dentists for the 
1998 – 2001 time-frames.  Dentists identifying themselves as Asian or American Indian 
were grouped together and account for 13.76 percent of the dentists accessed in these 
four years.  Only 3.68 percent of all the general dentists are identified as black.  More 
than eight (8.14) percent of the total number of general dentists accessed did not respond 
to the race question or did not identify with the racial options. 
Although racial distributions remained similar between cohorts, the 
percentage of Asians and American Indians increased in the 2000-2001 cohort by 4.77 
percent, and White representation fell by 3.78 percent. 
d. Age 
Nearly 80 (79.07) percent of these officers are under the age of 30 at their 
active duty commissioning date in this four year period.  Those officers between the age 
of 30 and 39 represent 20 percent in both cohorts.  Officers over 40 years of age are less 
than one percent in both cohorts. 
2. Continuation Rates for General Dentists 
Table 14 reports the continuation rates of general dentists who were 
commissioned in these two periods of time.  The 1998 – 1999 cohort shows a retention 
rate of 53.79 percent which is slightly lower than the 2000-2001 cohort which reports a 
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57.74 continuation rate.  The overall continuation rate for Navy general dentists who 
were accessed between 1998 and 2001 is 55.62 percent. 
 
Table 14.   General Dentist Continuation Rates by Individual Characteristics and Entry 
Cohort98 
 
Characteristics 1998-1999 Cohort 
N = 277 
2000-2001 Cohort 
N = 239 
Combined 
N=516 
Accession Source (%)    
Dental Student 56.41 87.50 68.25 
Direct Commission 80.65 64.71 75.00 
HSCP 63.10 33.93 51.43 
HPSP 39.84 61.27 51.32 
Gender (%)    
Female 54.76 62.07 57.75 
Male 53.37 56.35 54.81 
Race (%)    
Asian or American Indian 59.38 58.97 59.15 
Black 27.27 87.50 52.63 
No Response / Didn’t know 47.83 21.05 35.71 
White 54.98 60.12 57.29 
Age     
Under 30 52.97 55.03 53.92 
Between 30 and 39 57.14 67.35 61.90 
Over 40 50.00 100.00 66.67 
Retention (%)    
Stay 53.79 57.74 55.62 
 
a. Accession Source 
With a retention rate of 75 percent, the direct commission program 
provided the highest continuation score of all accession sources during the 1998 – 2001 
time period.  The direct commissioning retention rate in 1998 – 1999 was 80.65 percent, 
but dropped to 64.71 percent in the following two years.  HPSP had the lowest 
continuation rates during these four years; but, HPSP continuation rates increased by 
21.43 percentage points from the first cohort to the next.  A comparison of the two 
                                                 
98 Table created by author utilizing general dentist information from BUMIS. 
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cohorts shows an increase in retention rates for HPSP and dental students and a decrease 
for direct commission and HSCP officers from the 1998 – 1999 to the 2000 – 2001 
cohort. 
b. Gender 
Females had a slightly higher continuation rate, 57.75 percent, than males, 
54.81 percent, for the period of 1998 – 2001. Both males and females showed increases 
in their retention rates from the 1998-1999 cohort to the 2000 – 2001 cohort.  Males 
increased by 2.98 percentage points and females rose by 7.31 percentage points. 
c. Race 
The racial group categorized as Asian or American Indian had the highest 
continuation rate, 59.15 percent in this four year period of time.  Overall continuation 
rates for Whites were 57.29 percent and Blacks were retained at 52.63 percent.  During 
the 2000 – 2001 period, the Black retention rate was determined to be 87.50 percent, a 
60.23 percentage point difference from the 1998 – 1999 cohort.  White continuation rates 
also increased between the 1998 – 1999 and the 2000 – 2001 cohorts, but only by 5.14 
percentage points.   
d. Age 
Dentists over 40 at the time of their active duty commissioning had the 
highest retention rate among all age groups, 66.67, during this four year period of time.  
Those officers who were commissioned under the age of 30 at the beginning of their 
active duty service had the lowest retention rate with 53.92 percent.  Officers over 40 saw 
a 50 percentage point positive change in continuation rates between the 1998 – 1999 and 
2000 – 2001 cohorts.  Dentists between 30 and 39 at active duty entry had the highest 
retention rate in 1998 – 1999 with 57.14 percent opting to stay Navy.  This rate increased 
to 67.35 in the next two years. Continuation rates for general dentists under 30 remained 
fairly stable between the two cohorts, showing a 2.06 percentage point increase in the 
2000 – 2001 cohort over the 1998 – 1999 cohort. 
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D. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
1. Theoretical Model 
Multiple regression analysis allows for the estimation of retention models that 
consider several influencing factors.  In logistic regression models, the dependent 
variable is always categorical.  For the purpose of this research the binary dependent 
variable is stay, where stay equals 1 and leave equals 0.  The theoretical model formula 
follows: 
Li =ln(Pi/1-Pi) =  α + βxi 
where: 
Li = log of odds ratio 
Pi = Probability of continuation, given the personal attributes xi 
α = Intercept parameter 
β = Vector of slope parameters 
xi = Vector of explanatory variables 
2. Multivariate Logistic Regression Model 
The theoretical model used to analyze the retention behavior of general dentists is 
shown below.  Variable definitions are provided in Chapter IV. 
a. General Dentist Model  
The initial empirical model used to determine predicted probabilities for 
the continuation of General Dentists is: 
ln(Pi/1-Pi) = β0 + β1(FEMALE) + β2(BLACK) + β3(ASNAMIN) + 
β4(NORESPO) + β5(COM00_01) +  β6(DIRECT) + β7(HSCP) + 




FEMALE = being female 
BLACK = being African-American 
ASNAMIN = being Asian or American Indian 
NORESPO = unknown race or failed to answer 
COM00_01 = being commissioned in 2000 or 2001 
HSCP = being accessed through HSCP 
DENT_STU = being accessed as a dental student 
DIRECT = being accessed as a civilian dentist 
AGE3039 = being 30 through 39 years old at time of commission 
AGE40PLUS = being 40 or more years old at time of commission 
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IV. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS AND 
MODEL RESULTS 
A. DISCUSSION 
This section of the thesis defines and discusses the explanatory variables used to 
analyze the retention of general dentists who face their initial retention decision.  This 
section also states and justifies the expected effect of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable. 
B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
1. Explanatory Variables 
Demographics and accession sources are the two categories of explanatory 
variables used to evaluate the continuation behavior of general dentists who reach their 
first retention decision point.  Table 15 shows the expected sign for each explanatory 
variable. 
a. Gender (MALE, FEMALE)   
The gender variable is binary and MALE serves as the base case.  
Although more females are becoming dentists than in the past, the Navy Dental Corps, 
like the Navy as a whole, remains dominated by males.  Certainly, the integration of 
women on ships has provided more opportunities for women in the Navy.  However, if 
shipboard life is viewed negatively by women, this will have a negative impact on a 
female’s decision to remain in military service.  Additionally, quality of life 
improvements and a better understanding of female needs has made the Navy a more 
hospitable place to work for women,  yet, the nature of military life (i.e. family 




of a negative effect on females than males.  Therefore, overall, being female is expected 
to negatively affect a woman’s decision to continue in the Navy Dental Corps compared 
to a male dentist. 
b. Race (WHITE, BLACK, ASNAMIN, NORESPO) 
Race is described by four different categories:  WHITE, BLACK, 
ASNAMIN, and NORESPO.  WHITE serves as the base case since the Navy Dental 
Corps is predominantly white (74.32 percent).  NORESPO was included in the model 
because of the large number of unknowns or no responses to queries about race.  It is 
generally believed that minorities have more opportunities in military service than in the 
civilian workforce, due to the greater potential for racial discrimination in the civilian 
sector.  As a result, the overall effect on retention of minority group membership is 
anticipated to be positive.   
c. Age (UNDER30, AGE3039, AGE40PLUS) 
Officers were separated into three age categories depending on age at time 
of commissioning.  UNDER30 is the base case.  Older individuals are likely to have more 
job experience (whether as a dentist or not) and probably appreciate the benefits and job 
security offered by the military.  Therefore, age is anticipated to have an overall positive 
effect on retention decisions for officers who receive their commissions later in life. 
d. Sources of Entry and Year 
(1) Accession Sources (DENT_STU, DIRECT, HPSP, HSCP). 
As indicated earlier, there are multiple programs available for entry into the Navy Dental 
Corps.  One would expect that those programs that offer the most financial support would 
have the highest continuation rates.  HPSP, the most generous scholarship program, 
accesses the largest number of new dentists, and represents the base case.  HSCP 




service for up to 48 months, but must fund their school costs.  Therefore, HSCP, as an 
accession source, is expected to have a negative effect when compared to the base case of 
HPSP. 
Participants in non-scholarship programs such as direct 
commissions have other factors influencing their feelings towards the military and the 
likelihood of staying beyond their initial obligation besides money.  For example, dentists 
who are direct appointments (DIRECT) probably have experience in the civilian 
workforce and may chose to enter the Navy because they were frustrated with the 
complicated reimbursement process and the responsibilities associated with a civilian 
dental practice.  Compared to the base case (HPSP), DIRECT is presumed to have a 
positive effect on retention rates for general dentists. 
DENT_STU are participants in a discontinued accession program.  
They were commissioned as Ensigns in the Inactive Reserves, but unlike HPSP 
participants received no pay or scholarship for tuition, books, or equipment.  They were 
eligible for accession bonuses and the HPLRP to alleviate their education debt.  They are 
likely to have little attachment or reason to bond with the military beyond the agreement 
to join the DC after graduation. Therefore, one can expect DENT_STU to have a negative 
effect on continuation rates for general dentists.  
Dentists who entered under the FAP program were dropped from 
the analysis. There were too few observations in this data set for analysis, and all 
observations who were FAP participants were leavers.   
(2) Commission Year (COM98_99, COM00_01).  COM98_99 
represents the base case for commissioning year.  Officers commissioned in 2000 and 
2001 are more likely to endure more frequent and longer deployments associated with the 
Global War on Terror, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Therefore, it is likely that the commission year will have overall a negative effect on the 
retention decisions of officers commissioned in 2000 and 2001 compared to those 





Table 15.   Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs99 
Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Demographic   
Gender   
MALE Dichotomous Base Case 
FEMALE Dichotomous - 
Race   
WHITE Dichotomous Base Case 
BLACK Dichotomous + 
ASNAMIN Dichotomous + 
NORESPO Dichotomous  
Age at Commission   
UNDER30 Dichotomous Base Case 
AGE3039 Dichotomous + 
AGE40PLUS Dichotomous + 
Accession Source   
AFHPSP Dichotomous Base Case 
DIRECT  Dichotomous + 
DENT_ STU Dichotomous + 
HSCP Dichotomous - 
Commission Year   
COM98_99 Dichotomous Base Case 
                                                 
99 Table reflects the author’s perception of expected sign. 
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Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Demographic   
COM00_01 Dichotomous - 
C. RESULTS 
1. The Logistic Regression Model 
Table 16 shows the results of the logistic regression model. The General Dentist 
model includes ten explanatory variables, five of which are significant in explaining 
retention behavior, utilizing a one-tailed test.  The regression output shows officers 
commissioned in the 2000-2001 cohort (COM00_01) are 26.64 percent more likely to 
stay than the base case (COM98_99), significant at the .10 level.  DIRECT and 
DENT_STUD are both significantly more likely to continue in the military at the .01 
level than an HPSP participant. Those who did not list their race were found to be 
significantly less likely to continue military service at the .01 level than white dentists.  
However, those officers between the ages of 30 and 39 (AGE3039) when commissioned 
were more likely to continue with the Navy at the .10 level than the base case dentists 
who were under 30.   Table 16 shows the coefficients and levels of significance for each 
explanatory variable.     
 
Table 16.   Logistic Regression Results for General Dentist Model (one –tailed test) 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chisq 
INTERCEPT -.1232 .2461 
COM00_01* .2664 .0771 
DIRECT*** 1.2691 .0004 
DENT_STUD*** .8576 .0029 
HSPC .0777 .7187 
FEMALE .1999 .1697 
ASN_AMIN -.0777 .3883 
BLACK -.5711 .2572 
NORESPO*** -1.1433 .0007 
AGE3039* .3256 .0797 
OVER40PLUS .5079 .3482 
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Goodness of Fit Measures 
Log Likelihood Ratio (10 DF) Chi-Square = 30.6846 < .0007 
Generalized R-Square = .0577 Max-rescaled R-Square = .0773 
One-tail tests 
*** Significant at .01 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
* Significant at .10 level 
  
A model’s goodness of fit can be measured using several methods.  The predictive 
power of this model is low as evidenced by a generalized R-square of .0577 and a max-
rescaled R-square is .0773 as shown in Table 16.  This suggests that nearly 8 percent of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables.  
Although these numbers are relatively low, one can expect lower R-square values with 
logistic regression models than with OLS models.  However, and perhaps more 
importantly, the limited number of variables in this model also limits the level of the 
model’s predictive power.   
Another measure of goodness of fit, the Likelihood ratio, is significant at the .01 
level.  With this information, the null hypothesis that none of the explanatory variables 
has any effect on retention can be rejected (all βs equal 0) and it can be concluded that at 
least one coefficient (β) does not equal 0.   
Table 17 shows a classification table for the model, a third method for measuring 
goodness of fit. Dividing the frequencies of STAYs by the number of observations 
totaled .5562, a value that falls between .540 and .560 probability levels.  Choosing the 
.560 probability level, the classification table shows that this model correctly classifies 
52.7 percent of the observations.  The sensitivity results suggest that nearly 43 (42.9) 
percent of general dentists who opted to remain in military service were accurately 
classified.  Conversely, a specificity of 65.1 represents the percentage of those dentists 





Table 17.   Classification Table for General Dentist Model 
 















.560 123 149 80 164 52.7 42.9 65.1 39.4 52.4 
 
2. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
Year of commissioning was a significant factor in an officer’s decision to 
continue with military service.  Dental Officers commissioned in 2000 through 2001 
(COMM00_01) were determined to be more likely to stay in the Navy than those 
commissioned in 1998 through 1999.  This could potentially be an increase in patriotism 
or call to duty after the events of September 11, 2001 which would have occurred early in 
their initial obligation period.   
The FEMALE variable was determined to be positive but insignificant in the 
model, indicating that gender does not influence the retention behavior of general 
dentists.  This may suggest that females share similar perceptions about Navy life as their 
male counterparts and therefore their retention decisions are not affected by their gender. 
Surprisingly, race was not a significant factor in retention behavior.  Although the 
variables BLACK and ASN_AMIN had negative estimated signs, the results were 
insignificant.  This implies that minorities may hold the same feelings about opportunities 
in military service and the civilian sector as are held by those officers classified as white. 
Interestingly, 42 of the 516 dentists did not list (or did not know) their race.  The 
NORESPO variable proved to be negative and a statistically significant factor at the .01 
level.  It is difficult to explain this result, as there seems to be no reasonable basis on 
which to predict the retention behaviors of individuals simply because they fail to 
identify their race.  However, it is interesting to note that 62 (61.9) percent of the 
NORESPO were male and nearly 79 percent were under the age of 30.  This lack of racial 
identity may be a result of the officer’s refusal to provide this particular information to 
the government or perhaps the officer could not relate to the limited racial choices 
offered. 
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Age at time of commission had mixed results.  The results for AGE3039 were 
positive and statistically significant at the .10 level.  Officers commissioned in this age 
range are more likely to continue Navy service beyond their initial obligation than 
Officers under 30, representing the base case.  AGE3039 dentists are choosing more 
military dental experience over the opportunities offered by the civilian job market and 
lifestyle compared to younger dentists.    
Dental Officers, who were 40 and over at time of commissioning, showed 
different results than their colleagues in the 30 through 39 age range.  Compared to the 
base case the estimated results for OVER40PLUS were positive but insignificant.  The 
negative effect is contrary to the expected sign.  Although there were few dental officers 
in this category, the model suggests that they do not have a stronger affinity than officers 
commissioned less than 30 years of age to continue their Navy service beyond their initial 
obligation.  
3. Significant Variables and Partial Effects 
a. Notional Person 
The notional person method shows the partial effects of an explanatory 
variable on the probability of exceeding the initial obligation.  In the general dentist 
model all explanatory variables were dummy variables, and therefore were set to zero in 
specifying the notional or typical person.  Table 15 identified the variables creating the 
notional person (base case).  Each variable was then independently tested by changing the 
value of that variable to one.  The partial effect of that variable on the probability of 
continuation was determined by comparing the resulting probability of continuation with 
that of the base case, the notional person.  Table 18 illustrates the partial effects for the 



















*** Significant Variable at .01 
** Significant Variable at .05 
* Significant Variable at .10 
 
Based on these results, an officer commissioned in 2000 or 2001 was 6.65 
percentage points more likely to stay beyond his or her initial commitment than an officer 
commissioned in 1998 - 1999.  An individual who is exactly the same as the base case 
except for being accessed as a dental student, is 20.65 percentage points more likely to 
remain in the Navy beyond the first obligation than an HPSP accessed dentist; a direct 
accession would be nearly 29 percentage points more likely to be retained than a general 
dentist who entered through HPSP.  Those commissioned between their 30th and 39th 
birthday have a continuation rate 8.12 percentage points higher than the notional person, 
who was under 30 at time of commissioning.  It is interesting to note that those who 
match the base case except that they did not provide race information, are almost 25 
(24.94) percentage points less likely to continue their military career than a white officer.   
4. Potential Problems with the Model 
Perhaps the most striking issue with this model is the low R-square value, which 
is primarily a result of the limited number of variables in the model.  This would suggest 
that a degree of omitted variable bias exists.  Fewer independent variables reduce a 
model’s ability to explain dependent variable variation, and ultimately, negatively affect 
the model’s predictive capabilities.  However, the model retains its ability to describe and 
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identify characteristics that have significant effects on the continuation of officers in the 
Navy Dental Corps facing their initial obligation decision. 
Multicollinearity exists when several of the explanatory variables are highly 
correlated.  The problem with multicollinearity is that it inflates the variances of the 
coefficients of variables and may cause inaccurate signs and inconsistent coefficients.  To 
check for multicollinearity, variable inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated for each 
explanatory variable in the model.  Because the model has a low R-square, the best 
method to test for multicollinearity is to compare the model’s VIF with that of each 
independent variable.   
The comparable OLS model’s VIF is determined by the following formula:  1/(1-
R2), and the general dentist model has a VIF of 1.0602.  Only DIRECT and DENT_STU 
variables have VIFs greater than the model’s VIF, and the difference between the model 
and the variables are negligible.  A comparison among independent variables does not 
reveal any outstanding correlations.  Therefore, this evaluation suggests that 























V. AN AUCTION BASED RETENTION BONUS FOR THE 
DENTAL CORPS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Facing shortages in the Lieutenant Commander ranks as reported in CNA studies, 
and with only 55 percent of the general dentists opting to continue military service, a 
retention bonus could potentially resolve these manpower issues.  Chapters 3 and 4 
evaluated the retention characteristics of Navy general dentists, but unfortunately, the 
evaluation was not capable of determining the affects of monetary compensation because 
of the standard pay scale covering military members.  Yet, Navy Dental Corps 2004-2005 
exit survey results show that pay was the most identified reason for dentists choosing to 
leave military service.100  A CNP Quick Poll reported the top three factors to “greatly 
increase or increase desire to stay” involved money.101  More specifically, 86 percent of 
respondents admitted that a retention bonus would influence their intentions to remain in 
the Navy.   
Utilizing results from the American Dental Association’s (ADA) 2005 Salary 
Survey, this chapter discusses the opportunity costs of Navy general dentists, as measured 
by compensation, and applies an auction type retention bonus to provide an informed 
illustrative model of potential retention behaviors at an initial stay / leave decision 




                                                 
100 CAPT Phil Rinaudo, Dental Corps Planner, email to author 10 January 2007. 
101 Carol Newell, Kimberly Whittam, & Zannette Uriell, “CNP Quick Poll, Medical Communities: 
Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Nurse Corps,” 6 June 2005. 
102 Compensation is defined as all pay and eligible bonuses.  Non-pecuniary benefits are not 
considered. 
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B. COMPENSATION FOR GENERAL DENTISTS 
1. Civilian Compensation 
According to the ADA, nearly 90 percent of all dentists are identified as 
independent dentists. The average annual salary for all independent general practitioners 
was $185,940 in 2004.103  For all general dentists with less than five years of experience 
and who responded to the survey, the mean annual salary was $147,480.104  These 
dentists match approximately the level of experience a Navy general dentist would have, 
should that officer decide not to continue with military service after completing his initial 
obligation.   
Given the mean annual salary and the standard deviation, one can graphically 
describe the cumulative annual salaries for civilian general dentists, assuming salaries 
follow a normal distribution.105  Figure 2 provides this illustration, where the X-axis 
represents the standard deviations from the mean and the Y-axis represents compensation 
in thousands of dollars. 
 
                                                 
103 The American Dental Association, Survey Center, The 2005 Survey of Dental Practice: Income 
from the Private Practice of Dentistry, (Chicago, IL), January 2007, 7. 
104 Ibid., 13. 
105 The standard deviation was $68,320 with a sample size of 30 participants. 
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Average Annual Salary for Civilian General Dentists 

























Figure 2.   Cumulative Distribution of Average Annual Civilian General Dentist Salary 
With Less Than Five Years Experience, 2004106 
2. Military Compensation 
Based on the assumptions used for the earlier regression analysis, this thesis 
assumes a general dentist will face his first continuation decision at the fourth year of 
active duty service.  Table 18 shows the calculated annual pay for this officer as $79,253, 
including housing and subsistence entitlements plus ASP and VSP.107 
Table 19.   Annual Salary for Navy General Dentist with Fours of Active Duty Service108 
 
 
Pay Source Annual Amount ($) 
Base Pay 52,704 
Basic Allowance for Subsistence 2,313 
Basic Allowance for Housing 11,236 
Additional Specialty Pay 6,000 
Variable Specialty Pay 7,000 
Total 79,253 
                                                 
106 Figure created by author utilizing the mean annual salary and standard deviation provided by the 
ADA Survey Center, 2005 Survey of Dental Practice: Income from the Private Practice of Dentistry, 
January 2007. 
107 A dentist opting to take either a one or five year contract would have at least a 12 month 
obligation, and therefore, remains eligible for these bonus programs. 
108 Author created table and determined amounts with 2007 Military Pay Scale and Fiscal Year 2007 
Dental Officer Specialty Pay Plan. 
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3. Opportunity Cost 
By choosing to remain a uniformed dentist, Navy DC Officers opt for 
compensation lower than what is available in the civilian market.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, opportunity costs are defined solely by the monetary difference between civilian 
and military general dentists.  The true opportunity costs would be represented by bids 
submitted by each dentist.  In reality, there are other opportunity costs besides money, 
such as family separation, quality of life factors, etc., but salary differences are the easiest 
and most convenient to quantify.  Moreover, studies and polls suggest that money is a 
primary consideration when dentists are deciding to stay or leave active military service.   
The difference between the annual salary levels depicted in Figure 2 and the 
actual military pay is an opportunity cost.  In a theoretical cohort of 130 dentists facing 
the completion of their obligation period, the mean opportunity cost is approximately 
$68,000 per year.  Figure 3 illustrates these compensation differences, where the X-axis 
represents the number Navy dentists at their retention decision point.  The Y-axis 
describes the dollar difference between the two compensation levels.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Opportunity Cost for Military General Dentists With Four Years of Active 
Duty Service 
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C. PROPOSED BONUS STRUCTURE 
1. The Assumptions 
There are several assumptions with this retention bonus program.  First, a Navy 
Officer participating in the auction sells his service for multiple years and/or for one-year, 
respectively.  In exchange the Navy guarantees an annual fixed bonus plus employment 
for that specific period of time.  For the purpose of this thesis, the multiple year option is 
for a period of five years.  A one-year option is valid for only one year of bonus and 
employment.   
Retention bonus levels are determined through two consecutive auctions.  In the 
first auction, bids are accepted from dentists who wish to sell their services for a one year 
employment contract with the Navy.  These results establish an opportunity cost line.  
Winning bids are identified and asked to participate in a second auction that determines 
the bonus level for a five-year employment contract. 
The second assumption is that bidders in the second price auction will always bid 
truthfully since because their bid does not determine the bonus they are paid, only 
whether or not they are eligible to receive the bonus. There is no advantage to the bidder 
to overbid his services. In fact, a bid too high simply removes the seller from 
consideration for either the one or a five-year employment contract and bonus. 
The third assumption is that a more risk-averse officer will bid a lower price for 
his services in a five-year contract, and consequently, increase the savings for the Navy.  
Those who have a high tolerance for risk may select the one year bonus.  However, a 
dentist who selects a one-year option at the end of his initial obligation period is no 
longer eligible for the five-year option.  With no guarantees regarding future one year 
bonuses, the Officer who selects this option is willing to accept a higher degree of 
uncertainty.   
The one-year option allows the Navy a quick and flexible force shaping tool to 
ensure that its immediate operational needs are met.  The one-year option can be utilized 
to capture those dentists who are, in economic terms, considered to be “on the margin.”  
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These dentists probably do not have a strong affinity for military life, and do not intend to 
make the Navy a career.  Perhaps they are enticed by higher salaries in the civilian 
market or the infrequent family separation.  However, given the appropriate incentive 
they would be willing to complete another year on active duty.   
Of course, this one-year option is always based on the needs of the Navy and 
offers more uncertainty for the dentist.  If a sufficient number of dentists exist, then the 
one-year option would not be available. In this circumstance, a dentist completing his 
initial obligation would need to decide to accept the five-year employment contract with 
bonus, continue active duty service without a bonus, or face separation from active duty.   
For better planning purposes the Navy may decide to lock in a high percentage of 
five-year contracts.  Theoretically, this would reduce the number of one-year contracts 
needed and simultaneously reduce costs over a single year. However, at the onset of this 
program a large number of five-year contracts may increase short-term costs.  As the 
force is shaped and manned appropriately, these costs will be reduced. 
2. The Actors  
This proposed auction based retention bonus model reverses the roles of seller and 
buyer as described in the current Navy bonus system.  In this program, the dentists are the 
sellers and the Navy is the buyer.  General dentists are selling their professional services 
to the Navy in exchange for guaranteed employment for a specific period of time and an 
annual bonus.   
With multiple sellers (Navy DC Officers) and only one buyer (the Navy), the 
reverse auction is the most appropriate auction type.  Each seller has a personal value 
assigned to the service he offers.  He knows what level of compensation he wants in 
exchange for his services.  The Officer is aware of the opportunity costs and what he is 
giving up in exchange for continued service in the military.  The Dental Officer informs 
the Navy of this price, and then, the Navy must decide if the price is acceptable. 
Because Navy dentists are located globally, a sealed bid auction is the most 
efficient and effective method of delivering the desired price.  This could be done via a 
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web-site or email to a specific office that would consolidate and organize the bids.  After 
reviewing the bids, the Navy buys the services at the first excluded bid and pays that 
bonus level to all participating dentists.   
3. Economic Surplus 
An auction based retention bonus model has the potential to recover economic 
profits given to sellers in a traditional bonus program.  Current Navy practice is to 
determine a bonus level and pay everyone that same bonus without understanding the 
opportunity costs of the professionals they seek to incentivize.  This type of bonus is 
designed to capture those professionals at the margin and then pay everyone that amount.  
Consequently, with a traditional bonus there are professionals whose payment greatly 
exceeds their opportunity costs, resulting in a positive economic surplus for the seller 
(Navy DC Officers) through an income transfer from the buyer (Navy).  Figure 4 
illustrates the seller’s surplus in a traditional bonus program, where the X-axis represents 
the number of dentists and the Y-axis represents the bonus amount in thousands of 
dollars.  The area with the slanted lines is what the Navy must pay the dentists in this 






















Figure 4.   Traditional Navy Bonus Structure 
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An auction helps to find the bonus level based on a retention target, the desired 
number of professionals sought to be retained.  Initially, bids are accepted from dentists 
selling their services to the Navy for a one-year employment agreement.  These bids 
determine the actual opportunity costs.  If the auction stopped here, the surplus issue 
would remain much like that of the traditional method.  All sellers would receive the 
same bonus amount.  Figure 5 illustrates the seller’s surplus in the first auction, where the 
X-axis represents the number of dentists and the Y-axis represents the bonus amount in 
thousands of dollars.  The dotted area is the surplus economic rent paid to the seller 
(Navy Dentists) in excess of their theoretical opportunity costs. 


















Figure 5.   Economic Surplus for a One-Year Auction Based Bonus 
 
In this proposal, one-year contract winning bidders are then asked to submit a 
second bid, asking for the price of their services in exchange for a five-year employment 
agreement with the Navy.  Here, the Navy will be able to recover some of the lost 
economic surplus, because the second auction brings the bonus level closer to the true 
opportunity costs of these professionals.   
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The five year contract is designed to attract those dentists who are more risk 
averse and/or those who have a strong affinity for military life.   Figure 6 illustrates the 
seller’s surplus in the second auction, where the X-axis represents the number of dentists 
and the Y-axis represents the bonus amount in thousands of dollars.  The dotted area is 
the excess economic rent paid to the seller (Navy Dentists) who opted for a five year 
contract.  The black and white diamond area represents the savings to the Navy.  The 
solid shaded area illustrates the economic surplus paid to those dentists whose one year 
bids were accepted. 
 
Figure 6.   Potential Savings and Economic Rents Paid to Winning Bidders 
4. The Formula 
This bonus program operates on a fundamental break-even economic formula.  
The formula is:  M = A(1-pT) / T(1-p) + B[1-(1-pT) / T(1-p)] 
where: 
M = the multi-year annual payment (certainty equivalent) 
T = the time period in years 
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A = the amount of the one-year bonus 
B = the opportunity cost (civilian pay) 
p = the probability that a one-year bonus is offered each year 
The benefit of this formula is that it allows the Navy to select a cost priority.  For 
example, the Navy may choose to minimize one-year contract costs, which would mean 
that the Navy would be relying more on long term contracts to supply its dental 
professionals rather than buying the services of dentists for a single year.  Conversely, the 
Navy could choose to minimize long term contract costs and instead focus on retaining 
medical professionals for only one year beyond the initial obligation. This flexibility is an 
advantage over the current bonus structure in terms of force shaping. 
5. The Formula Applied 
Without experimental or actual survey data, the best this thesis can provide is a 
theoretical application of an auction based retention bonus.  Economic experiments, in 
conjunction with other theses, are currently in progress, but results are not available for 
discussion or application at this time. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the theoretical cohort of general dentists facing the 
completion of their initial obligation is 130.  Suppose the Navy seeks to retain 78 general 
dentists, the formula can determine the five-year bonus level necessary to appropriately 
incentivize 78 dentists to contract with the Navy.  For this example, the Navy seeks a 
manning plan that guarantees a higher retention of five-year contract personnel and will 
accept 20 one-year contracts.   
In the next step, the Navy calls for bids for a one-year contract and determines the 
one-year bonus level to be $70,000, based on a reverse 2nd price sealed bid auction. Then, 
the question is to identify the value of M, the annual bonus level for these five-year 
contract dentists.  The variable T is five years.  In this theoretical example, the Navy 
desires a low number of one-year contracts, so the probability for the one-year contract, 
A, is placed at .15, represented by the variable p.  If one assumes the opportunity cost to 
be the annual civilian general dental salaries as reported by the ADA, then B equals 
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approximately $69,000.  The annual retention bonus (M) for general dentists would be 
$69,170.  The annual compensation for a Navy general dentist would then be $149,253.  
Of course, should the Navy desire to lower the multi-year bonus, this retention  
bonus structure provides the Navy a flexible force option,  the ability to offer more single 
year employment contracts and bonus options.  For instance, if one assumes the Navy 
seeks 40 5-year contracts instead of 58 as in the previous example and the opportunity 
cost is $57,000, then the multi-year bonus would be reduced to $58,842 per year.  
Naturally, the number of single year bonuses would increase accordingly to 38.   
Table 20 shows the pay sources and annual amounts for a general dentist utilizing 
these examples.   
 
Table 20.   Annual Salary for Navy General Dentist with Four Years of Active Duty 
Service Plus a One-Year or Five-Year Retention Bonus109 
 















Base Pay 52,704 52,704 52,704 
Basic Allowance for 
Subsistence 
2,313 2,313 2,313 
Basic Allowance for 
Housing 
11,236 11,236 11,236 
Additional Specialty Pay 6,000 6,000 6,000 
Variable Specialty Pay 7,000 7,000 7,000 
Retention Bonus  70,000 69,170 
 
58,842 
Total 149,253 148,423 138,095 
 
The one-year and higher guaranteed options reveal that the theoretical annual 
salary of a Navy would exceed the current mean compensation for civilian general 
dentists with comparable years.  This is not surprising.  This illustration assumes the 
                                                 
109Author created table and determined amounts with 2007 Military Pay Scale and Fiscal Year 2007 
Dental Officer Specialty Pay Plan. 
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mean opportunity cost for a Navy dentist is based on the mean civilian compensation.  If 
the Navy chooses to retain more than 50 percent of its dentists then it must pay more than 
the mean civilian salary in this example.   Actual bids will reflect the sellers’ 
consideration of other factors affecting their opportunity costs such as quality of life, 
civilian liability insurance, et cetera.   
However, even with an “exaggerated” opportunity cost, the auction based 
retention bonus still distributes less money than a traditional bonus program. With the 
proposed traditional method, the Navy would pay nearly $5.460 million to general 
dentists annually.  Utilizing an auction based bonus, the Navy would spend $52,000 less 
annually but provide higher levels of retention for general dentists.  The greatest savings 
comes from a more flexible force option which lowers the multi-year bonus level but 
requires more one year contracts.  This option saves approximately $450,000 annually.  
Table 21 compares the costs of a traditional and auction based bonus programs. 
 
Table 21.   Cost Comparison Between a Traditional and Auction Based Bonus 
 













78 20 58 38 40 
Bonus Level  $70,000 $70,000 $69,107 $70,000 $58,842 
Sub-total $5,460,000 $1,400,000 4,008,206 $2,660,000 $2,353,680





Again, one could expect potential savings to be greater provided actual opportunity costs 
are less than what was used in this model. 
 59
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Retention studies provide a valuable service to policy makers because they are 
capable of identifying factors that significantly impact an individual’s decision to 
continue active duty service.  With this information, manpower policy makers can create 
or adjust programs, policies, and procedures to meet the immediate and long term needs 
of the Navy.   
This thesis, utilizing BUMIS data, identifies some key characteristics of Navy 
general dentists and their retention behavior.  The research focused on accession sources 
and personal demographics for 516 general dentists, commissioned between 1998 and 
2001.   Results from a logistic regression estimated general dentists, who entered the 
Navy through Direct Commissioning and the Dental Student programs, were 29 and 20 
percent respectively more likely to continue beyond their initial obligation compared to 
those officers accessed through HPSP.  However, these programs have not been as 
successful as HPSP in recruiting dentists, as nearly 60 percent of Navy general dentists 
are accessed through HPSP.  Dentists commissioned between the ages of 30 and 39 are 
more likely to continue service beyond their initial obligation than younger dentists.  
Race and gender were determined not to significantly affect retention decisions.   
With a Navy active duty continuation rate of only 55 percent, general dentists are 
being drawn away from military service.  Multiple studies support this conclusion.  
Subsequently, this low retention figure has created a significant shortage of Lieutenant 
Commanders and left many billets unfilled in the Navy Dental Corps.  Designed 
correctly, the retention bonus can be a flexible tool to assist personnel planners in 
controlling and predicting manning levels while simultaneously incentivizing the 
appropriate number of dentists to stay Navy and continue military service.   
Beyond the logistic regression, this research explored the impact of an auction 
based retention bonus for general dentists to counter the attraction of the civilian sector.   
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The mathematical foundation for the auction based retention bonus is a break-
even formula.  In order to determine the bonus level for a multi-year bonus, the formula 
requires inputs such as opportunity costs, the length of the multi-year bonus, the 
probability of a one-year contract, and the value of the one year contract.  The difference 
between average military pay and civilian general dentist salaries represented opportunity 
costs.  In this model, the theoretical opportunity cost was calculated to be $69,000.  
Further, for the purpose of this thesis, the Navy sought to retain 78 out of 130 dentists 
with 58 agreeing to stay for an additional five years (40 in the flexible force option), the 
length of the multi-year contract.  Therefore, the model assumed a low probability of a 
one-year bonus (.15).   
The model predicted the Navy could buy the services of 58 (40 in the flexible 
force option) general dentists at the end of their initial obligation for five years with a 
$69,000 ($57,000 in the flexible force option) annual bonus.  An additional 20 (38 in the 
flexible force option) dentists would agree to an additional year for $70,000.  Although 
these numbers seem extreme, their high values are not a surprise, as the only opportunity 
cost examined in this illustrative model was compensation.  Actual bids from Navy 
general dentists will reflect true opportunity costs, and are anticipated to be lower than in 
this theoretical model.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy Dental Corps should focus its recruiting efforts on those accession 
programs whose participants are more likely to stay Navy.  Based on this research the 
Navy should therefore target direct commissions (the Dental Student program was 
terminated).  Unfortunately, direct commissions today are extremely challenging to 
recruit as demonstrated by the inability to meet single digit recruiting goals.  Of course, 
this also may be a consequence of recruiting efforts aimed at participants for HPSP and 
HSCP which have higher recruiting goals.  In either case, the Navy Dental Corps needs to 
work to retain its professionals.  Although this seems obvious, it is worth mentioning, 
because retention becomes vitally important when overall recruiting goals are not being 
achieved.   
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Although there are multiple possible solutions to address retention, for the Navy 
general dentist, a retention bonus seems to be an obvious remedy.  An auction based 
retention bonus, as demonstrated in this work, determines bonus levels closer to a general 
dentist’s true opportunity costs and hence could potentially save significant funds to be 
used in other areas.  Further study in this area is warranted, especially live auction 
experiments.  
As this research was ending, NAVADMIN 053/07 announced the Navy Dental 
Corps Critical Skills Retention Bonus (DC CSRB) for qualified general dentists.  DC 
CSRB offers general dentists with three to eight years of active commissioned service 
$40,000 for two years, provided they have not been selected for, started, or completed 
residency or advanced clinical training,.  The DC CSRB may be renewed consecutively 
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